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Sticky Prices, Limited Participation, or Both? 
 





This paper investigates the micro mechanisms by which monetary policy affects and is 
transmitted through the US economy, by developing a unified, dynamic, stochastic, general 
equilibrium model that nests two classes of models. The first sticky prices and the second 
limited participation. Limited participation is incorporated by assuming that households are 
faced with quadratic portfolio adjustment costs. Monetary policy is characterized by a 
generalized Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing. The model is calibrated and 
investigates whether the unified model performs better in replicating empirical stylized 
facts, than the models that have only sticky price or limited participation. The unified model 
replicates the second moments of the data better than the other two types of models. It also 
improves on the ability of the sticky price model to deliver the hump-shaped response of 
output and inflation. Moreover, it also delivers on the ability of the limited participation 
model to replicate the fall in profits and wages, after a contractionary monetary policy. 
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 1. Introduction
Following is the consensus empirical evidence of the eﬀect of an unanticipated contrac-
tionary monetary shock in the U.S.: There is a delayed, time-reverting, hump-shaped
response of output, with the peak eﬀect occurring after approximately 6 quarters; a
hump-shaped response of inﬂation, with a peak response after approximately 8 quar-
ters; a decrease in proﬁts and real wages1; and an immediate decrease in the growth rate
of money. With respect to second moments, U.S. data after 1979:3 document a positive
correlation between output and lags of output, money growth, inﬂation, and the interest
rate. All the above correlations are negative before 1979:2.
It is an important and still open research question, what are the micro mechanisms
by which monetary policy aﬀects, and is transmitted through the economy. During
the past few years, two competing classes of models have been used to analyze the
monetary transmission mechanism, namely sticky price and limited participation models.
The former class is based on the Keynesian idea of nominal price rigidity. The latter
emphasizes the role of barriers to ﬂows of funds across ﬁnancial and goods markets, in
other words the inability of agents to costlessly engage in ﬁnancial transactions in all
periods. However until this paper they were not both incorporated in a single model
capable of investigating their relative importance and whether in conjunction they can
explain more of the empirical regularities.
Previous work by Christiano et. al. (1997), and King and Watson (1996), compared
the performance of sticky-price and limited participation models, and tended to view
these two classes of models as competing. King and Watson base their comparison
on second moments, and ﬁnd that the sticky price model generates less business cycle
variability than in the data, speciﬁcally, too little variation in the real interest rate. In
the limited participation model, variability is almost entirely due to real rather than
monetary shocks and too much variability is present in the real interest rate. In terms
of covariability, only the sticky price model reproduces the leading indicator behavior
of prices, and only the limited participation model generates a negative relationship
between money and future values of output. Both models generate positive covariance
of prices and lagged output. Christiano et. al. ﬁnd that although the sticky-price
model fails to reproduce the decrease in proﬁts after a contractionary monetary policy,
the limited participation model is able to do so, only with high labor supply elasticity
and high average mark-up. Lastly, Christiano et. al. argue that in order to be able
1For example, see Christiano et. al. (1997).
1to reproduce important empirical characteristics of the data, one should incorporate in
those models a source of real rigidities in the labor market.
Therefore, the natural research strategy after King and Watson (1997) and Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) is to combine both frictions in a uniﬁed model.
Dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) models that allow for only one type of
friction cannot explain very well how the economy responds to an unanticipated mone-
tary policy shock. Hendry and Zhang (2001) and Keen (2001) investigate the gainsfrom
incorporating both frictions. Hendry and Zhang (2001) develop a DSGE model for
Canada, in which limited participation is characterized with a time cost of portfolio
adjustment, in the utility function. Sticky prices are introduced with a price-adjustment
cost in the intermediate goods market and a wage adjustment cost in the household’s
decision problem. Henry and Zhang show that portfolio adjustment costs induce persis-
tent deviations of inﬂation and output from the steady state. On the other hand, price-
adjustment costs are less eﬀective, having only a minimal eﬀect on inﬂation and output.
Keen (2001) develops a DSGE model similar to Dow (1995). Limited-participation is
introduced as a time cost of portfolio adjustment. Sticky prices are introduced as in
Levin (1991) wage contract rules. The model can match the empirical responses of real
and nominal variables to an expansionary monetary shock (the rise in output, the larger
relative increase in investment than consumption, the gradual increase in the price level
and the decline in the nominal interest rate) without imposing any implausible assump-
tions (e.g. large capital adjustment costs). Although both models are able to get better
results by incorporating both frictions, it should be stated that none of them is able to
reproduce the hump-shaped response of output to a monetary shock.
This paper brings these two lines of research together. It develops a uniﬁed, coherent,
dynamic, stochastic, general, equilibrium model that nests these two structural speciﬁ-
cations, and investigates what additional insights into understanding the business cycle
can be gained, by allowing both frictions to coexist. In particular, it asks whether the
uniﬁed (U) model performs better than the models that have only one friction, the sticky-
price-only model (SP) and the limited-participation-only model (LP). Sticky prices are
incorporated by assuming that monopolistically competitive ﬁrms face a quadratic cost
of nominal price adjustment, following Rotemberg (1982). Limited participation is in-
corporated by assuming that households face a quadratic cost of portfolio adjustment,
following Cooley and Quadrini (1999). The uniﬁed model is shown to perform better
than either the sticky-price-only or the limited-participation-only versions of the model
on empirical grounds. It does so both in terms of matching second moments of the data
2and the shape of empirical impulse responses. Only the combined model can deliver the
hump-shaped response of output and inﬂation and the decrease in proﬁts and wages af-
ter a contractionary monetary policy, something that previous models that incorporate
both frictions are unable to do so.
The model developed in this paper, diﬀers from those in the literature in that it
allows for endogenous interest rate setting and considers a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the
portfolio adjustment cost. In order to describe the monetary policy of the Federal Re-
serve, an interest rate rule that generalizes Taylor’s (1993) speciﬁcation is used, allowing
the interest rate to respond to its lags as well as to output and inﬂation. Concerning
the portfolio adjustment cost, a quadratic adjustment cost is introduced in the utility
function of the representative household rather than in its budget constraint like Cooley
and Quadrini (1999). The representative agent faces utility costs of portfolio adjust-
ments, generated by factors such as the time required to obtain information about new
opportunities in ﬁnancial markets or to contact the stock broker to arrange transactions.
Both of these additional features turn out to be important in helping the model explain
key features of the data.
The model is used to analyze the eﬀect of four individual types of shocks: policy,
technology, preference, and money demand shocks. To gain intuition on the functioning
of the model, impulse responses generated by its three possible versions are compared:
the sticky-price-only, the limited-participation-only and the uniﬁed frameworks. Only
the uniﬁed version of the model embodies strong internal propagation mechanisms in
order to deliver the shape of empirical impulse responses: the hump-shaped response
of output and inﬂation and the decrease in wages and proﬁts after a monetary policy
shock. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) show that a model with habit per-
sistence in preferences for consumption, adjustment costs in investment and variable
utilization accounts for the delayed, hump-shaped response of output and inﬂation after
a monetary policy shock. The model developed in this paper shows that time-separable
preferences can deliver this pattern with the proper speciﬁcation of the portfolio ad-
justment. The introduction of the portfolio adjustment cost introduces consumption
rigidities. Since in this setup, portfolio adjustment costs is introduced in the utility
function, the model mimics habit persistence in preferences for consumption. In addi-
tion, the uniﬁed model can generate the 0.4-0.6 percent deviation of output from the
steady state after a 1 percent policy shock, whereas the sticky-price-only model produces
an excessively large output response. This is a common limitation of sticky price models.
The limited-participation-only model produces a decrease in proﬁts and real wages after
3a contractionary monetary policy shock, a result that is also inherited in the uniﬁed
framework.
Although impulse response analysis provides an intuitive way to analyze the mone-
tary transmission mechanism, empirical studies have shown that the unsystematic por-
tion of policy-instrument variability is quantitatively small in relation to the variability
of the systematic component. Therefore, it is more informative to analyze both the sys-
tematic and unsystematic component of monetary policy by studying second moments.
Accordingly, model-generated vector autocorrelations are compared with those of U.S.
data. The most important ﬁnding of this paper is the ability of the uniﬁed framework
to replicate most of the second moments in the data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2, below, sets up the
model. Section 3 describes the data and the parameterization of the model. Section 4
discusses the results and the importance of the degree of the portfolio adjustment cost.
Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. Overview
The DSGE model combines elements of existing sticky price and limited participation
speciﬁcations. Sticky prices are incorporated, following Rotemberg (1982), by assuming
that monopolistically competitive ﬁrms face a quadratic cost of nominal price adjust-
ment. Limited participation is incorporated, following Cooley and Quadrini (1999), by
assuming that households face a quadratic cost of portfolio adjustment. These costs of
price and portfolio adjustments permit the monetary authority to inﬂuence the behavior
of real variables in the short run.
There are ﬁve types of agents in the economy: a representative household, a represen-
tative ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm, a representative bank, a continuum of intermediate
goods-producing ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ [0,1], and a monetary authority. Time periods
are indexed by t = 0,1,2,.... The behavior of each agent is described in the subsections
below.
2.2. The Representative Household
The representative household enters period t with Mt−1 units of money and Kt units of
capital. Immediately following the realization of the period-t shocks, the household must
4decide how to divide its funds into an amount Dt to be deposited in the representative
bank and an amount Mt−1 − Dt to be used to facilitate goods purchases.
When choosing Dt, the household faces a quadratic portfolio adjustment cost, mea-










where φd ≥ 0 governs the magnitude of the adjustment cost and where, as noted below,
  ≥ 1 denotes the gross steady-state rate of money growth. In the steady state, since Dt
grows at the money growth rate, the adjustment cost is equal to zero. Diﬀerently from
Cooley and Quadrini (1999), the quadratic cost of adjustment in this speciﬁcation is
introduced in the utility function of the household rather than in its budget constraint,
since it is assumed that the agent faces utility costs of portfolio adjustments. These costs
can be generated by factors such as the time required to obtain information about new
opportunities in ﬁnancial markets or to contact the stock broker to arrange transactions.
During period t, the household supplies ht(i) units of labor at the nominal wage Wt
and Kt(i) units of capital at the nominal rental rate Qt to each intermediate goods-










for all t = 0,1,2,....
During period t, the household purchases output from the representative ﬁnished
goods-producing ﬁrm at the nominal price Pt, and then divides its purchases into an
amount Ct to be consumed and an amount It to be invested. Since it is assumed that
the household receives its wages before making its goods purchases, it faces the cash-in-
advance constraint
Mt−1 − Dt + Wtht
Pt
≥ vt(Ct + It) (2)
for all t = 0,1,2,.... In (2), vt is a random term that measures the amount of money the
household must carry to facilitate its purchases of goods. It is basically a shock to the
inverse of the quarterly rate of the income velocity of M2, and it is assumed to follow
the autoregressive process
5ln(vt) = (1 − ρv)ln(v) + ρv ln(vt−1) + εvt, (3)
where v > 0, 1 > ρv > 0, and the serially uncorrelated innovation εvt is normally
distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σv.
By investing It units of the ﬁnished good during each period t, the household increases
the capital stock over time according to









where 1 > δ > 0 is the depreciation rate, the parameter φk ≥ 0 governs the magnitude
of capital adjustment costs, and g is the gross steady-state growth rate of the capital
stock.
At the end of period t, the household receives its rental payments QtKt along with
principal plus interest rd
tDt from the bank; hence, rd
t measures the gross interest rate on
deposits. The household also receives nominal proﬁts Bt from the representative bank
and Ft(i) from each intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm i ∈ [0,1], for a total of Bt + Ft





The household then carries Mt units of money into period t + 1; it faces the budget
constraint
Mt−1 + (rd
t − 1)Dt + Wtht + QtKt + Bt + Ft
Pt




during each period t = 0,1,2,....
The household, therefore, chooses Ct, ht, τt, Dt,Mt, It, and Kt+1 for all t = 0,1,2,...





tat[ln(Ct) − γ(ht + τt)], (6)
subject to the constraints imposed by (1), (2), (4), and (5) for all t = 0,1,2,.... In the
utility function, 1 > β > 0, and γ > 0. The preference shock at follows the autoregressive
process
ln(at) = ρa ln(at−1) + εat, (7)
where 1 > ρa > 0, and the serially uncorrelated innovation εat is normally distributed
with mean zero and standard deviation σa. It resembles a shock to the IS curve in more
traditional Keynesian analysis.
6Let Λ1t denote the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint (5) and let Λ2t denote
the Lagrange multiplier on the cash-in-advance constraint (2). Then the household’s
ﬁrst-order conditions include (1), (2), (4), and (5) with equality, along with
at = (Λ1t + vtΛ2t)Ct, (8)









































































for all t = 0,1,2,....
2.3. The Representative Finished Goods-Producing Firm
The representative ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm uses Yt(i) units of each intermediate
good i ∈ [0,1] , to produce Yt units of the ﬁnished good according to the constant returns
to scale technology described by






with θ > 1. Intermediate good i sells at the nominal price Pt(i), while the ﬁnished
good sells at the nominal price Pt. Given these prices, the ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm





for each t = 0,1,2,....
7The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem imply that
Yt(i) = [Pt(i)/Pt]
−θYt (15)
for all i ∈ [0,1] and t = 0,1,2,..., which reveals that −θ measures the price elasticity
of demand for intermediate good i. Competition in the market for the ﬁnished good
requires that the representative ﬁrm earn zero proﬁts in equilibrium. This zero-proﬁt
condition determines Pt as
Pt =






for all t = 0,1,2,....
2.4. The Representative Bank
At the beginning of period t, the representative bank accepts deposits Dt from the
representative household. It also receives a lump-sum nominal transfer Xt from the
monetary authority. Thus, it can lend Lt(i) to each intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm
i ∈ [0,1], subject to the constraint






At the end of period t, the bank collects rtLt(i) in principal and interest from each
intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm i ∈ [0,1]; hence, rt denotes the gross nominal interest
rate on loans. Since the bank owes rd
tDt to its depositors, its proﬁts are given by
Bt = rtLt + Dt + Xt − Lt − r
d
tDt. (18)




for all t = 0,1,2,.... So long as the net nominal interest rate rt −1 is positive, the bank
will lend all of its funds and (17) will hold with equality.
82.5. The Representative Intermediate Goods-Producing Firm
The representative intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm hires ht(i) units of labor and Kt(i)
units of capital from the representative household during period t in order to produce





1−α ≥ Yt(i), (20)
where 1 > α > 0 and where g ≥ 1 denotes the gross rate of labor-augmenting techno-
logical progress. The aggregate technology shock zt follows the autoregressive process
ln(zt) = (1 − ρz)ln(z) + ρz ln(zt−1) + εzt, (21)
where z > 0, 1 > ρz > 0, and the serially uncorrelated innovation εzt is normally
distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σz.
The ﬁrm rents capital on credit, but must pay its wage bill with funds Lt(i) borrowed
from the representative bank. Therefore it faces the ﬁnance constraint
Lt(i) ≥ Wtht(i) (22)
for all t = 0,1,2,.... Since these funds are borrowed at the gross rate rt, the ﬁrm must
repay principal plus interest rtLt(i) at the end of the period.
Since intermediate goods substitute imperfectly for one another as inputs in the
production of the ﬁnished good, the representative intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm
sells its output in a monopolistically competitive market. Thus, during each period
t, the representative intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm sets a nominal price Pt(i) for
its output, subject to the requirement that it satisfy the representative ﬁnished goods-
producing ﬁrm’s demand, taking Pt and Yt as given.
In addition, the intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm faces a quadratic cost of adjusting









where φp ≥ 0 governs the magnitude of the adjustment cost and π ≥ 1 denotes the gross
steady-state rate of inﬂation and is measured in terms of the ﬁnished good and increases
proportionally with the size of Yt of the overall economy. Following Rotemberg (1982),
this cost captures the negative eﬀect of price changes, which increase in magnitude with
the size of the price change and the total output of the economy Yt.
9These costs of price adjustment make the intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm’s prob-
lem dynamic. It chooses ht(i), Kt(i), Yt(i), Lt(i), and Pt(i) for all t = 0,1,2,... to






subject to the constraints imposed by its production possibilities, by the ﬁnance con-
straint (22), and by the demand curve
Yt(i) = [Pt(i)/Pt]
−θYt
for all t = 0,1,2,....
In (24), Λ1t is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint (5) from the rep-
resentative household’s problem, so that β
tΛ1t/Pt represents the marginal utility of an
additional dollar of proﬁts during period t for the representative household and










measures the ﬁrm’s nominal proﬁts during period t.
When the net nominal interest rate rt − 1 is positive, the ﬁnance constraint (22)
holds with equality. In this case, the ﬁrm’s problem simpliﬁes to one of choosing ht(i),


























for all t = 0,1,2,.... The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are (26) with equality,












































10for all t = 0,1,2,..., where Ξt is the Lagrange multiplier on (26). The log-linearized
version of (29), yields the New Keynesian forward looking Phillips Curve.
2.6. The Monetary Authority
The monetary authority conducts monetary policy by gradually adjusting the short-term
nominal interest rate rt in response to deviations of detrended inﬂation πt = Pt/Pt−1 and
output yt = Yt/gt and from their steady-state values π and y, according to the policy
rule
ln(rt/r) = ρr ln(rt−1/r) + ρπ ln(πt/π) + ρy ln(yt/y) + εrt, (30)
where r, π, and y are the steady-state values of rt, πt and yt, respectively. In (30),
the parameters ρr, ρπ, and ρy are positive. The parameter ρr captures the degree of
interest rate changes smoothing, and ρπ and ρy the degree of the interest rate reactions
to inﬂation and output deviations from their steady state values, respectively. The
case in which ρπ/(1 − ρr) is greater than one is consistent with the Fed’s policy to
stabilize inﬂation. The same stands for output if ρy/(1 − ρr) is greater than zero. The
serially uncorrelated innovation εrt is normally distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation σr.
The above policy rule resembles the one put forth by Taylor (1993) to describe Federal
Reserve’s behavior from 1987 through 1992, but it generalizes Taylor’s speciﬁcation by
allowing policy to respond to the lagged interest rate as well as output and inﬂation.
As discussed in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997), the Federal Reserve has a tendency to
smooth changes in interest rates. Therefore, each period it adjusts the Funds rate to a
linear combination of its past values.
2.7. Symmetric Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms make identical deci-
sions, so that ht(i) = ht, Kt(i) = Kt, Ft(i) = Ft, Yt(i) = Yt, Pt(i) = Pt, and Lt(i) = Lt for
all i ∈ [0,1] and t = 0,1,2,.... In addition, the market-clearing condition Mt = Mt−1+Xt
must hold for all t = 0,1,2,.... These equilibrium conditions, together with the ﬁrst-
order conditions for the representative agents’ problems, the laws of motion for the
aggregate shocks, and the policy rule, form a system of diﬀerence equations describing
the model’s equilibrium. In the absence of shocks, the economy converges to a steady
state. The system is log-linearized around its steady state, and Klein’s method (2000)
is applied to obtain a solution of the form
11ft = Ust (31)
and
st = Πst−1 + Wεt (32)
for all t = 0,1,2,....
In (31) and (32), ft is the vector of the model’s ﬂow variables which includes output
yt = Yt/gt, inﬂation πt, the current values of the bank deposits dt = Dt/Mt, money
growth  t, consumption ct = Ct/gt, investments it = It/gt, the multipliers λ1t = gtΛ1t,
λ2t = gtΛ2t, and ξt = gtΞt, the real factor prices wt = (Wt/Pt)/gt, and qt = Qt/Pt,
banks proﬁts bt = Bt/Mt, bank loans lt = Lt/Mt, hours worked ht, and real proﬁts
ft = (Ft/Pt)/gt. st is the vector that includes the model’s endogenous state variables
and the model’s four shocks. The model’s endogenous state variables are the lagged
values of real balances mt−1 = (Mt−1/Pt−1)/gt−1, the lagged values of the bank deposits
dt−1 = Dt−1/Mt−1, the lagged interest rate rt−1, and the current values of the capital
stock kt. The four shocks in the model are the money demand shock vt, the preference
shock at, the technology shock zt and the policy shock εrt. The vector εt includes the
four innovations εvt, εat, εzt, and εrt and is assumed to be normally distributed with zero
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The parameters that describe private agents’ tastes, technologies and the policy rule
determine the elements of the matrices Π, W, and U.
3. Data, Parameterization
3.1. Data
In the data, output is measured by real GDP in chained 2000 dollars, while money
growth by changes in the M2 money stock. Inﬂation is measured by changes in the
GDP implicit price deﬂator, and the interest rate by the three-month Treasury bill rate.
All series, except for the interest rate, are seasonally adjusted. In addition, the series
12for output is expressed in per-capita terms by dividing by the civilian noninstitutional
population age 16 and above.
Distinct upward trends appear in the resulting data for per capita output, consump-
tion and investments. In the model though it is assumed that these variables ﬂuctuate
around a deterministic trend. Therefore, a linear trend is removed from the logarithm
of each one. In addition, in the model the variables ﬂuctuate about their steady-state
values in response to shocks, therefore the mean is removed from the logarithm of all
data as well.
The data are quarterly and run from 1959:1 through 2007:3, and are divided into
two subsamples, the ﬁrst covering the period 1959:1 through 1979:2, and the second
covering the period from 1979:3 through 2007:3. The breakpoint corresponds to the
widely believed change in the US monetary policy, that occurred at the beginning of
Paul Volker’s tenure as Chairman of the Federal Reserve System. Prior the 1980s,
monetary policy in the US was highly accommodative. After a decrease in the real
interest rates while anticipated inﬂation rose, the Federal Reserve Bank used to increase
the nominal interest rate but usually less than the increase in expected inﬂation. After
1980s though, monetary policy is believed to have been more stabilizing and systematic
than before. The Federal Reserve Bank systematically raised real as well as nominal
interest rates in response to higher expected inﬂation, adopting a proactive behavior2.
3.2. Parameterizing the Model
As mentioned above, distinct upward trends appear in the series of output, real bal-
ances, consumption, investment, capital stock, real wages and real proﬁts of the inter-
mediate goods producing ﬁrm. The model accounts for these trends in the data by
including a deterministic term in the production function, that captures the eﬀects of
labor-augmenting technological progress for each intermediate good. The model also
implies that the variables listed above grow at the same growth rate g along a balanced
growth path. The log of the growth rate is estimated with a regression of the log of real
per capita GDP, ln(Yt), on a constant and a trend. Thus, g is set equal to 1.0047 and
1.005, pre and post 1979:2, respectively. In the model, this yields steady-state growth
in real per-capita output of about 1.9 and 2 percent, pre and post 1979:2, respectively
Regressions of the growth rate of the GDP implicit price deﬂator, ln(Pt/Pt−1), on
2As Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), and Boivin and Giannoni (2002) show, unexpected exogenous
interest rate shocks has a reduced eﬀect after 1980s.
13a constant provides estimates of ln(π). Steady-state inﬂation is estimated to be 1.0107
and 1.0085 pre and post 1979:2, respectively, and per quarter. In the model, this values
of π implies that the steady-state annual rate of inﬂatin is about 4.3 percent and 3.4,
pre and post 1979:2, respectively. This is an indication that pre 1980s the U.S. economy
experienced higher inﬂation.
The steady-state equilibrium condition of the cash-in-advance constraint (2), implies
that the log of the money demand shock is equal to the log of real balances minus the
log of consumption and investment. Therefore, the calibrated steady-state value of the
money demand shock, v, is equal to the average of the exponent of the log of the money
demand shock, which is equal to 3.0917 and 2.6218, pre and post 1979:2 respectively. A
regression of the calculated demeaned log of money demand shock on its lag provides the
estimates of the serial correlation and the standard deviation. Thus, serial correlations
are 0.9989 and 0.9976, and standard deviations are 0.0408 and 0.0979, pre and post
1979:2 respectively.
The calibrated values for the preference and technology shocks are taken from Ireland
(1999), who estimates with maximum likelihood a sticky-price model that incorporates
similar speciﬁcations. The model assumes that the steady-state preference shock a is
equal to 1 for both periods. Its serial correlation, ρa, set equal to 0.94 and 0.89, pre and
post 1979:2 respectively, with a standard deviation equal to 0.03 for both periods. The
steady-state value of the technology shock z is set equal to 4000 and 4500, with serial
correlation ρz equal to 0.92 and 0.96, and standard deviation equal to 0.015 and 0.008
pre and post 1979:2 respectively.
Some structural parameters are set equal to values commonly used in the literature.
The weight on hours worked in the representative household’s utility function γ is set
equal to 1.5793, which implies that the household spends about one third of its time
working in the model’s steady state. The quarterly depreciation rate, δ, is set equal to
0.025, and capital’s share in production α is set equal to 0.36. As Kim (1998) and King
and Watson (1996) suggest, large capital adjustment costs are needed in order for sticky-
price models to generate sensible responses of output to monetary shocks, therefore, the
degree of capital adjustment cost, φk, is set equal to 40. The parameter that measures
the degree of market power possessed by the representative goods-producing ﬁrm, θ, is
set equal to 6. This value implies a steady-state markup of price over marginal cost
equal to Rotemberg and Woodfords’s (1992) benchmark of 20%. Lastly, the discount
factor β is set equal to 0.995.
To characterize the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy rule, calibrated values are
14taken to be close to values from Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Christiano and
Gust (1999). The former paper estimates interest rate reaction functions for the U.S.
economy, pre and post Volker, while the latter discusses what implications the inter-
est rate rules have on the model’s uniqueness, explosiveness and indeterminacy. As
discussed by Christiano and Gust (1999), in a model that incorporates limited partici-
pation in the ﬁnancial markets and price ﬂexibility, the interest rate response to inﬂation
ρπ should be high, while the interest rate response to output ρy should be low, results
that conﬂict with the empirical analysis by Christiano, Gali and Gertler (2000). In a
sticky-price-only model, there is not a lot of intertemporal substitution in consumption
since prices are rigid. Therefore, an increase in expected inﬂation lowers the real interest
rate through the Fischer equation, which causes an increase in investments, output and
actual inﬂation. In this case, if the central bank adopts a tight monetary policy with a
high interest rate response to output and inﬂation, the causality from expected inﬂation
to actual inﬂation stops, so that high expected inﬂation is not self-fulﬁlling. If prices are
ﬂexible though, but frictions in ﬁnancial markets are present, higher anticipated inﬂation
increases consumption today versus future consumption and decreases today’s deposits
to the ﬁnancial sector. This causes the nominal interest rate to rise. If the interest rate
response to inﬂation, ρπ, in the interest rate rule is low, the central bank must inject
liquidity into ﬁnancial markets to prevent a large increase in the interest rate, which will
cause an increase in inﬂation. Therefore this increases the probability that high inﬂation
expectations can be self-fulﬁlling, and creates indeterminacy or explosiveness. Following
the same logic, a high interest rate response to output ρy, also results in self-fulﬁlling
inﬂation expectations, since the interest rate from lower deposits in ﬁnancial markets
results in a lower output and that is going to oﬀset the increase in the interest rate
caused by a high ρπ.
Not surprisingly, the widely known interest rate rule popularized by Taylor (1993),
where there is no interest rate smoothing in the policy rule (30), meaning that ρr is set
equal to zero, and where ρπ and ρy are set equal to 1.5 and to 0.5 respectively, produces
an indeterminate equilibrium. Therefore, the degree of interest rate smoothing ρr is set
equal to 0.75 post Volker and 0.7 pre Volker, and the interest rate response to inﬂation
is set equal to 0.45 and 0.5 pre and post Volker respectively. This values are justiﬁed
by the estimated interest rate rules by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). The interest
rate response to output ρy is set equal to 0.01 in both subsamples, in order to have
determinacy in the model. The σr is set equal to 0.007 pre-1979 and 0.004 post-1979.
The diﬀerent policy rules for the two sub-samples justiﬁes the change in the way that
15monetary policy was conducted after the 1980s.
The model in this paper incorporates both sticky prices and limited participation.
Therefore three versions of the model can be analyzed and compared. In the sticky-price-
only (SP) version of the model, φp is greater than zero, while the portfolio adjustment
cost φd is zero. In the limited-participation-only (LP) version of the model φd is greater
than zero, while prices are ﬂexible (φp is set to zero). And the last one, the uniﬁed-
version of the model (U), incorporates both adjustment costs, therefore both φp and φd
are greater than zero. In the real business cycle version of the model, the economy is
frictionless in the sense that there are no portfolio or price adjustment costs, meaning
both φd and φp are equal to zero.
In this model, (θ − 1)/φp represents the fraction of the discrepancies between the
target prices P∗
t+j (the nominal price that would prevail in the absence of price adjust-
ment costs) and the actual prices Pt+j, that are eliminated per quarter after after a
change in the price level at date t3. This means that when the degree of market power
possessed by the representative goods-producing ﬁrm, θ, increases or when the degree
of price adjustment costs φp is lower, price adjustments become more rapid. The value
of φp in the SP and U model is set equal to 70, a value close to the estimated one from
Ireland (1999). Since θ is set equal to 6, around 7.1% of the discrepancies are eliminated
every quarter.
The value of φd in the LP and U models is set equal to 0.8 in the case that the model
produces impulse responses that match those in the data. It is set equal to 5 for the
model to match second moments of the data. The former is called low φ
L
d and the latter
high φ
H
d portfolio adjustment cost.
4. Results
4.1. Low Portfolio Adjustment Costs
Although four shocks are incorporated in the model (policy, technology, preference and
money demand shocks), only two of those are going to be analyzed, the policy and the
technology shocks. Figures 1 and 2 display impulse responses of output, money growth,
inﬂation, nominal interest rate, real wages and real proﬁts for the SP, LP and U versions
of the model, after those two shocks. All impulse responses shown are for the period
3See Ireland (2000). Calvo rationalizes this speciﬁcation with the assumption that only a fraction
of ﬁrms adjust their prices each period.
16after 1980s4.
Empirically, after an unanticipated contractionary monetary policy, a delayed hump-
shaped response of output, with the peak eﬀect occurring after 6 quarters is observed.
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) show that a model with habit persistence
in preferences for consumption, adjustment costs in investment and variable utilization
accounts for the delayed, delivers the hump-shaped response of output and inﬂation after
a monetary policy shock. They conclude that a model with standard, time-separable
preferences cannot be consistent with this pattern.
The model developed in this paper shows that time-separable preferences can deliver
this pattern with the proper speciﬁcation of the portfolio adjustment cost. The intro-
duction of the quadratic portfolio adjustment cost in the utility function, brings in the
model deposit rigidity. The cash-in-advance constraint links consumption and deposits,
and therefore this rigidity is transmitted to consumption. So, this model mimics habit
persistence in preferences for consumption.
The strong internal propagation mechanisms that this setup embodies, is able to
deliver the shape of empirical impulse responses, only if it includes both sticky prices,
and limited participation. The most interesting ﬁnding concerning impulse responses is
the fact that when portfolio adjustment costs are low, the response of output is hump-
shaped, in the uniﬁed model. In addition, the uniﬁed model can generate the 0.4-0.6
percent deviation of output from the steady state after a 1 percent policy shock, whereas
the sticky-price-only model produces an excessively large output response, a common
ﬁnding in pure sticky price models. Therefore the portfolio adjustment cost is a necessary
but not a suﬃcient condition for the hump-shaped response of output and inﬂation to
the policy shock.
Another feature of the data that got a lot of attention by Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (1997) is the negative response of wages and proﬁts to a contractionary mon-
etary policy. Although sticky price models cannot generate these features, Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (1997), ﬁnds that a limited participation model does. This is
true also in the framework developed in this paper. The LP model produces this decrease
in proﬁts and wages, although the SP model does not. The uniﬁed model succeeds in this
aspect as well. Therefore this is a result that is also inherited in the uniﬁed framework.
4Similar results can be obtained for the period before 1980s.
174.2. High Portfolio Adjustment Costs
Although impulse response analysis provides a good way to analyze the functioning
of the model and the eﬀect of monetary shocks to the economy, McCallum (1999) ar-
gues that exogenous shocks, the unsystematic portion, account for a very small fraction
of monetary policy-instrument variability. He continues arguing that this variability
is quantitatively small in relation to the variability of the systematic component and
suggests that more emphasis should be given to the systematic portion of policy behav-
ior. Therefore, it is more informative to analyze both the systematic and unsystematic
component of monetary policy by studying second moments.
Instead of data impulse responses, data vector autocorrelation functions are esti-
mated. A VAR system with four lags is used to estimate the vector autocorrelation
functions. Since this analysis doesn’t focus on the identiﬁcation of the unsystematic
component of monetary policy, the VAR system doesn’t have to be shock identiﬁed.
The purpose of shock identiﬁed VAR models is to identify the unsystematic component
of monetary policy, not to generate policy-invariant equation systems, that governs the
eﬀect of systematic or anticipated policy actions.
In an attempt to match second moments for longer lags as well, the degree of portfolio
adjustment costs should be increased5. Although the parameterization with low degree
of portfolio adjustment costs is able to reasonably replicate impulse responses and the
correlations for short lags, it cannot replicate second moments for longer lags. Figures 3
and 4 display the model-generated correlation functions, with high portfolio adjustment
costs equal to 5, together with the U.S. data correlation functions for output, money
growth, inﬂation and interest rates, for both periods, pre and post 1980s, respectively.
In addition, table 2, displays a summary of the correlations and standard deviations.
As a general result, only the U model can matche very well the second moments of the
data, especially for the period pre 1980s.
Concerning the behavior of output after 1979:2, during the business cycle, all models
produce higher output volatility than observed in the data. This is a common charac-
teristic of SP models, as discussed in Ellison and Scott (2000).
The correlation of interest rate and lagged output is positive in the data post 1980s,
indicating that the interest rate is a positive lagging indicator of output. This is ex-
5It has been investigated that the parameterization with low degree of portfolio adjustment costs is
able to reasonably replicate impulse responses and correlations for only short lags. Figures not shown
in the paper. Available by request.
18plained by the behavior of the Federal Reserve, which is more likely to implement tight
monetary policy to avoid inﬂationary pressures in periods of growth. Only the U model
is able to capture this stylized fact post 1980s. The SP and LP versions of the model
together with the SP and LP models in the King and Watson (1996) show that the
interest rate is negatively lagging indicator of output. Before 1979:2 the scenario is not
the same as the data produces a negative correlation of interest rate and lagged output.
This fact justiﬁes the argument that the U.S. economy was working in a completely
diﬀerent regime prior to the 1980s. All models are able to capture this stylized fact in
the data.
Prior to 1979:2 the correlation between diﬀerent leads and lags of inﬂation and out-
put is negative in the data and this is true for all models considered for that period.
Concerning the period after 1980s, that correlation is positive in the data most of the
times, and only the U model is able to capture this stylized fact.
All models produce the negative correlations of money growth and lagged output
and of lagged money growth and output before 1979:2. On the other hand, those same
correlations are positive after 1979:2. Only the U model gives a positive correlation of
output and lagged money growth for a short amount of time.
Empirically, it is observed that after an unanticipated contractionary monetary pol-
icy, there is a delayed hump-shaped response in inﬂation, with a peak response after
about 8 quarters. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) argues that in order for a DSGE model to
replicate this sluggish response of the inﬂation rate to the shocks hitting the economy, in-
ﬂation rigidities should be included in the model. In my speciﬁcation, the uniﬁed model
is able to capture this sluggishness in inﬂation without incorporating inﬂation rigidities.
With high portfolio adjustment costs, inﬂation response to a contractionary monetary
policy is hump-shaped, with the peak occurring after 4 quarters. This is consistent with
Ireland (2001) that shows that after estimating a DSGE model with price and inﬂation
rigidities, the US data prefer a model with adjustment costs applying to the price level
but not to the inﬂation rate.
5. Conclusions
This paper brings together two classes of models that during the past few years, have
been used to study monetary aspects of the business cycle: the sticky price models,
which draw on traditional Keynesian ideas of nominal price rigidity, and the limited
participation models, which emphasize instead the role of barriers to ﬂows of funds
19across ﬁnancial and goods markets. It develops a uniﬁed, coherent dynamic, stochastic,
general, equilibrium (DSGE) model that nests these two structural speciﬁcations, and
investigates what extra insights can be obtained by allowing both frictions to coexist.
Sticky prices are incorporated by assuming that monopolistically competitive ﬁrms face
a quadratic cost of nominal price adjustment, following Rotemberg (1982). Limited par-
ticipation is incorporated by assuming that households face a quadratic cost of portfolio
adjustment, following Cooley and Quadrini (1999). In addition the model allows for
endogenous interest rate setting, an interest rate rule that generalizes Taylor’s (1993)
speciﬁcation, allowing the interest rate to respond to its lags as well as to output and
inﬂation.
The uniﬁed model performs better than either the sticky-price-only and limited-
participation-only versions of the model on empirical grounds, both in terms of matching
second moments of the data and the shape of empirical impulse responses.
Only the uniﬁed version of the model with low portfolio adjustment costs embodies
strong internal propagation mechanisms in order to deliver the shape of empirical impulse
responses: the hump-shaped response of output and inﬂation and the decrease in wages
and proﬁts after a monetary policy shock. Time-separable preferences can deliver this
pattern with the introduction of the portfolio adjustment cost in the utility function,
and the model is able to mimic habit persistence in preferences for consumption. This
means that the portfolio adjustment cost is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition for
the hump-shaped response of output. In addition, the uniﬁed model can generate the
0.4-0.6 percent deviation of output from the steady state after a 1 percent policy shock,
whereas the sticky-price-only model produces an excessively large output response. Also,
the limited-participation-only model produces a decrease in proﬁts and real wages after
a contractionary monetary policy shock, a result that is also inherited in the uniﬁed
framework. Moreover, it produces a hump-shaped response of inﬂation to a monetary
contraction with a higher degree of portfolio adjustments.
One of the most important ﬁnding of this paper is the ability of the uniﬁed framework
with high portfolio adjustment cost to replicate most of the second moments in the data,
both in the short run and the long run: the positive correlations of output with lagged
money growth, lagged inﬂation and lagged interest rate, lagged output with money
growth, inﬂation and interest rate for the period after 1979:2, and the negative ones for
periods before 1979.
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23Table 1: Calibration Values
Parameter Full Sample Parameter Pre-1980 Post-1980
β 0.995 g 1.0047 1.005
γ 1.5793 π 1.0107 1.0085
δ 0.025
α 0.36 v 3.0917 2.6218
θ 6 ρv 0.998 0.997
φk 40 σv 0.0408 0.0979
SP LM U ρa 0.94 0.89
φp 70 0 70 σa 0.03 0.03
φ
L
d 0 0.8 0.8
φ
H







24Table 2: Summary of Cross-Correlations with high portfolio adjustment costs
(Corxt,yt+k), where yt is output and xt is the series in column one)
1959:1 - 1979:2 1979:3 - 2007:3
σ k σ k
-4 0 4 -4 0 4
Output
Data 0.063 0.907 1 0.907 0.018 0.625 1 0.625
SP 0.180 0.945 1 0.945 0.162 0.916 1 0.916
LP 0.185 0.931 1 0.931 0.169 0.785 1 0.785
U 0.181 0.909 1 0.909 0.190 0.686 1 0.686
Money Gr.
Data 0.009 -0.597 -0.608 -0.428 0.008 0.168 0.023 0.093
SP 0.049 -0.226 -0.165 -0.200 0.102 -0.034 -0.009 -0.049
LP 0.021 -0.720 -0.670 -0.624 0.020 -0.523 -0.388 -0.268
U 0.040 -0.226 -0.152 -0.379 0.090 0.224 0.559 0.079
Inﬂation
Data 0.008 -0.296 -0.475 -0.645 0.004 0.292 0.231 -0.021
SP 0.015 -0.832 -0.858 -0.879 0.009 -0.647 -0.543 -0.677
LP 0.071 -0.180 -0.342 -0.229 0.159 -0.052 -0.386 -0.139
U 0.057 -0.130 -0.032 -0.279 0.127 0.204 0.555 0.065
Int. Rate
Data 0.005 -0.005 -0.132 -0.412 0.007 0.409 0.414 0.129
SP 0.016 -0.844 -0.923 -0.861 0.011 -0.622 -0.795 -0.643
LP 0.047 -0.358 -0.550 -0.412 0.109 -0.228 -0.620 -0.273
U 0.070 -0.089 -0.147 -0.334 0.195 0.397 0.369 0.031
Wages
SP 0.075 0.845 0.828 0.749 0.066 0.781 0.807 0.699
LP 0.086 0.826 0.879 0.793 0.094 0.601 0.827 0.557
U 0.102 0.635 0.733 0.491 0.166 0.403 0.810 0.334
Proﬁts
SP 0.221 0.778 0.774 0.831 0.242 0.642 0.516 0.670
LP 0.185 0.931 1.000 0.931 0.169 0.785 1.000 0.785
U 0.697 0.099 0.028 0.302 1.718 -0.232 -0.483 -0.017
25Figure 1: Percent Deviation from the Steady State to a One Percent Policy Shock
Period 1979:3 - 2007:3
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0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40Figure 3: Vector Autocorrelation Functions for the period 1959:1 - 1979:2
Grey Line - Data Black Dotted Line - Sticky Price Model - SP[Φp=70, Φd=0]
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0 8 16 24 32 40Figure 4: Vector Autocorrelation Functions for the period 1979:3 - 2007:3
Grey Line - Data Black Dotted Line - Sticky Price Model - SP[Φp=70, Φd=0]
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